Lester_Peterson [he/him]

Given their practice of restrained and selective targeting away from civilians, and public commitment against further escalation, its nearly impossible for me to imagine Iran approving (even tacitly) of an untargetted mass shooting at a transit station in a neighbourhood that is 1/3rd Arab, as an element in Operation True Promise 2.

To me, this raises the question of how the attack then came to coincide nearly exactly with the operation. It seems extremely unlikely that it was a coincidence. Was Hamas informed of the operation in advance by Iran, and they then planned the shooting to coincide with it without telling?

Absolutely, and while manpower is something which could be remedied in the next few years by throwing money at the problem (which the U.S. has) the Navy’s rotted sealift supply capacity can not. The resources a fleet consumes during war are astronomical, and American currently could not supply most of its ships simultaneously if it wanted to right now, during a relative peace. The Navy has only 33 active duty auxiliary vessels, and the majority of civilian ships in the sea-lift reserve are not currently seaworthy.

The incomparable logistics advantage the PRC would have in the Taiwan strait (because their infrastructure and industrial base is right there instead of across an Ocean) is another reason why America would be virtually guaranteed to lose a protracted naval war there.

I’m usually one to err on the side of caution when it comes to estimating America’s strength, the PLA certainly isn’t relying on wishful thinking when they assess the strength of the U.S. military; so I won’t either. However, practically all signs point to U.S. shipbuilding being extremely cooked. The best comparison of the relative effectiveness of a country’s shipbuilding industrial capacity comes from their share of merchant tonnage. From that, the PRC produces half of global tonnage in civilian ships every year, while the U.S share is 0.2%.

American shipbuilders survive entirely due to military contracts, where their performance is characterized by cost overruns, poor workmanship, and constant delays. On the other hand, the luxury of choices offered to PLANF procurement means China can launch new naval vessels at a rate and price magnitudes better than the U.S. navy. Comparing the difference in production efficiency between the two countries, and it’s like how in WW2 the USSR spent one-one hundredth the man hours to build a single T-34 as the Nazis did for a Tiger tank (not an exaggeration, the costs were 3000 man hours for a T-34 and 300,000 per Tiger). And half the T-34s wouldn’t break down before arriving to the battlefield.

What lingering advantages the United States would have in a naval conflict come down to their inertia and (IMO) still superior air power. Both edges are fading fast, and 2027 may well be what the Pentagon has determined to be their “point of no return” after which PLA dominance in the Taiwan strait will be undisputed.

In other dying empire news, the US Navy’s recently released Navigation Plan has the primary goal of preparing the Navy for war with the PRC by 2027. The plan also reads like a hybrid between marketing speak and a r/worldnews comment