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Class struggle in all its forms.
I am going to violate my posting break just to leave this article:
Gay universalism, homoracialism and « marriage for all » by Houria Bouteldja.
I have had arguments over this on here and Lemmygrad and so I am not going to engage further.
Just know that there is a different set of arguments and realities that we in the global south have to deal with it, away from the tired (and often orientalist/chauvinist) liberal-conservative dichotomy.
Hey folks! I will be busy for a long while and will probably be inactive on this site for the same period. I am starting my final year of university - very exciting times ahead.
As a result I’d like to leave a short primer about Malaysian and Singaporean politics on a highly contentious issue: race. Feel free to DM for further elaboration or sources regarding Malaysian/Singaporean politics. I am happy to oblige (whenever I have the time).
Alright, here it goes.
Class, race, culture, community, ethnicity and religion. All are jumbled up when talking about politics in Malaysia and Singapore.
How so? Firstly we have to take a civilisational approach: Chinese, Indian, Malay and Orang Asal (“Original People”) all have their own unique history of thousands of years, and within each there are defining characteristics that define their social structure.
What happens when this long overlapping cultural exchange in the Straits of Malacca gets disrupted by more recent and numerous immigration from South and East Asia under colonization?
This leads to stratification and polarization of the Malayan political economy (old name for Peninsular Malaysia that includes Singapore).
The Malayan Left had many arguments and debates on how to handle these fundamental cultural issues that have plagued the region for centuries. The debate is still ongoing.
However, there, perhaps 2 main strands can be identified:
1. Those that defines cultural autonomy as the primary contradiction.
2. Those that defines class and national liberation as the primary contradiction.
Many organisations can be labelled as one or the other but those within the same camp may not necessarily agree with each other with everything.
For an example, those that fall into
1. often fall into communal fights with other groups. An example of this would be the Chinese Literacy Movement that sought to maintain the existence of colonial era Chinese Language Schools, which more often than not, are also not under the purview of the colonial government (ie. in effect are private schools).
2. often underestimate the role of culture and race in the social reproduction of the Malayan economy. An example of this would be the MCP (Malayan Communist Party). In many of their party debates, it was often assumed that after national liberation was achieved, racial/cultural/communal issues would vanish. Unfortunately for us, we did not achieve true independence and the racialised political economy remains.
Prologue -
I can continue of course but I hope this short glimpse can help you understand why in my arguments I often involve terms such as “racialised”, “culture” or “chauvinism”. Because it is an essential part of understanding Malayan politics.
But understanding Malayan politics also requires some understanding of South, East and Southeast Asian politics. Under the global hegemony of US-led Capital, Eurocentrism and Orientalism pervades many thinkers, even in the Global South. There must be acknowledgment of this fundamental inequality of intellectual production which is overwhelmingly skewed to the West.
Only then you can finally understand and deal with the material realities of what we, the peoples of the Third World, have to face everyday.
See Read you all later.
The Diplomat- India’s Struggle to Find a Meaningful Role in Southeast Asia
I sometimes read The Diplomat as a guilty pleasure because between their tainted liberal platitudes showcases a deep insecurity and incoherence characteristic of Liberalism.
To establish itself as a significant actor in the region, India needs to consciously seek common ground with Southeast Asian countries on fundamental questions of regional order.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Singapore and Brunei Darussalam in early September once again underscored Southeast Asia’s enormous significance in Indian foreign policy – not only for strategic and economic reasons but because India cannot credibly claim to be a global power until it demonstrates that it can play a meaningful role within its own extended neighborhood. The Indian government has pursued the Look/Act Eastpolicy for three decades with the aim of strengthening its security, trade, and culturalpresence within the ASEAN region. “For India, no region now receives as much attention as this,” Modi declared at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018.
Yet, after 30 years of the Look/Act East policy, the relationship has failed to gain momentum on its own, and India is struggling to define a meaningful role for itself in Southeast Asia. For the last six years, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s The State of Southeast Asia surveys have found that the region’s elites consistently rank India lowest among all major powers in terms of its strategic, political, or economic influence in Southeast Asia. In 2024, nearly 2,000 respondents from academia, governments, and civil society across the region ranked India ninth out of 11 major powers in its strategic relevance to the ASEAN countries.
These are just stating some facts which are more or less true.
A key cause of India’s inability to carve out a greater role for itself in the region is the fundamental divergence in their international approaches. Although Southeast Asian countries are not a monolith, they have developed a broad consensus on four key questions. India maintains a markedly different outlook on all four.
Okay I would actually agree with this at face value. But let’s get into the details.
First, as small countries facing significant external threats, Southeast Asians support and wish to strengthen the existing U.S.-led rule-based global order, some misgivings aside. The ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak survey shows that the regional elites continue to favor U.S. leadership of the world. India, on the other hand, espouses a multipolar world. Despite its improving relations with the United States, it has often expressed skepticism toward U.S. global leadership. The ongoing Ukraine War provides a clear instance of the stark divide between India and Southeast Asian countries. While most of the region has supported United Nations resolutions condemning the Russian invasion, India had consistently abstained from voting against Moscow’s interests.
??? And in an instant the article reveals it’s liberalism. Obviously wrong in multitude of fronts.
Perhaps the author has not gotten the memo of multiple ASEAN leaders specifically utilising the word “multipolarity” in their speeches? India has no power in Southeast Asia not because they did not condemn Russia silly liberal. There is no “stark divide”.
Southeast Asians support and wish to strengthen the existing U.S.-led rule-based global order, some misgivings aside
You will find that anti-US sentiment in SEA is not merely just “misgivings” nor as easy to brush over because outwardly most SEA nations engage in bilateral relations with the USA.
Second, Southeast Asian countries have pursued a relatively firm but friendly approach toward China. While wary of Beijing’s rising assertiveness, they have sought mutually beneficial economic cooperation and tried to avoid sustained confrontation with it. They have been careful not to be swept up in the emerging China-U.S. rivalry.
Meanwhile, India’s relations with China have sharply deteriorated following their border skirmish in 2020. New Delhi considers Beijing to be its strategic and economic rival, and it increasingly sees its presence in Southeast Asia as a direct competitor to China. This zero-sum mindset has made many in the region uncomfortable.
Yes, even the annoying liberals in Southeast Asia recognise where the wind blows.
Third, export-dependent Southeast Asian countries broadly support liberal international trade, while India is often ambivalent and hesitant to open up its markets. While calling for an “open” Indo-Pacific, the Modi government has also promoted protectionist policies under its “Make in India” campaign. As per the latest data from the World Trade Organization, the average import tax in India is 18.3 percent, while in Southeast Asia it ranges from 0 to 11.5 percent. In 2019, India backed out of the ASEAN-centered free trade agreement called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) at the last minute. India’s trade deficit with Southeast Asia has grown rapidly in the last two decades to reach nearly a quarter of the total trade, which makes it all the more hesitant to keep its market open to the manufacturing hubs of the region.
Classic free market liberalism that many of the intellectual elites in Southeast Asia regurgitate due to their own moral and intellectual bankruptcy.
The vacuous hole that is liberalism and its understanding of international relations. It can never shed its western bourgeois origins and the compradors in the region lap it up like the obedient dogs they are.
The final point of difference is regional multilateralism, a highly-prized feature of Southeast Asian politics. ASEAN is one of the most successful regional organizations in the world, instrumental in fostering peace and economic cooperation in the region. In contrast, India is a reluctant regionalist. Historically, New Delhi has preferred to deal with its smaller South Asian neighbors bilaterally rather than multilaterally. South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world, with moribund regional forums. While New Delhi has sought to act as a constructive partner to ASEAN, it has yet to demonstrate that it can champion regional cooperation and lead the establishment and management of regional institutions.
The divergence between the international outlooks of India and Southeast Asia places limits on what the Look/Act East policy can achieve. India’s incremental investments in the region through trade deals or military exercises are unlikely to bridge the divide. In fact, as the international order comes under growing strain, differences over such first-order principles will become increasingly salient. To establish itself as a significant actor in the region, India needs to consciously seek common ground with Southeast Asian countries on fundamental questions of regional order. Rather than assuming that others will follow its lead by default, it has to invest in understanding the needs and perspectives of its neighbors in order to encourage a united front to confront future challenges.
To lead Asia, India may need to rethink some of the basic precepts of its worldview.
Guest Author Sandeep Bhardwaj an independent researcher based in Singapore. His doctoral dissertation was on India’s relationship with Southeast Asia during the Nehru years.
Ah that explains it. I was already suspecting Singaporean brainworms from the 5th paragraph.
So in the end the guy got 2/4 of correct but only by coincidence. I think he may need to switch careers since he evidently has failed to do his own job’s namesake.
The Jakarta Post - Broadening the prospects for shared future of China-ASEAN community
*Note: I would rate The Jakarta Post to something like SCMP. Sometimes the article itself is fine, sometimes it is Liberalism. The paper itself has ties to the Indonesian ruling class and intellectual elite.
…As Chinese ambassador to ASEAN, I would emphasize that the resolution not only has a profound impact on the future of China, but also pools of vast opportunities for the development of ASEAN countries. It thus will open broader prospects for the China-ASEAN community’s shared future.
First, China’s reform will help China and ASEAN achieve common development. During the past 33 years, the two parties have joined hands to pursue modernization.
…The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects such as the China-Laos Railway and the Whoosh Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway have helped promote regional connectivity and economic development along the line. The successful and vibrant China-ASEAN relationship has brought tremendous tangible benefits to the 2 billion people in the region.
…Second, China’s further reform and opening up will inject new impetus to China-ASEAN relations. The resolution outlines plans for fostering new quality productive forces, nurturing new areas for international cooperation, including next-generation information technology, artificial intelligence, aviation and aerospace, new energy, new materials, high-end equipment, biomedicine and quantum technology.
ASEAN is drafting the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and its strategic plans, and making great efforts in developing the digital economy, green economy and blue economy, as well as other emerging industries. With more and more confluence of interests, China and ASEAN can align their strategies to explore more potential cooperation in the future.
China-ASEAN cooperation on clean energy has continued to expand in recent years. Chinese brands account for 67 percent of electric vehicles sold in ASEAN, contributing to the energy transition in our region.
…China stays committed to fully implementing the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative, and calls for an equal and orderly multipolar world and universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization. China will continue to implement the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in a high-quality manner and promote regional economic integration. China will continue to unleash the opportunities of BRI cooperation to further enhance regional connectivity.
Global Times - ‘For the sake of Filipino nation, we should not take any side’: Philippine scholar at Beijing Xiangshan Forum
“We have been historically very friendly with each other for centuries long before the Western colonizers came. Let’s go back to where we have been.”
This was true for the entirety of Maritime Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, Tabunda suggested that relevant parties should "abandon the ‘territorial perspective’ on the South China Sea, and adopt a new one similar to China’s concept of “pursuing joint development while shelving disputes.”
Joint development has proved to be a robust way to ensure peace while negating Western imperialist meddling.
The Economist - In South-East Asia, the war in Gaza is roiling emotions
Far more than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war in Gaza is rattling public opinion in three key South-East Asian countries: Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The first two have Muslim-majority populations, and Singapore, largely ethnic-Chinese, has a Muslim minority of 16%. As on campuses in America and in street protests in Europe, the sympathies among those who are concerned about the conflict—and who in Singapore include many young non-Muslims—are for Palestinians suffering from Israel’s heavy-handed prosecution of the war.
Strong feelings have thus made the war a political challenge in ways that are connected, but also vary from country to country. Malaysia’s prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, is by far the most strident leader in South-East Asia in support of the Palestinians. Mr Anwar has decried what he says was Western pressure to condemn Hamas, the hardline group ruling Gaza that started the war with a brutal raid on Israel.
While Palestine maintains an official embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Hamas can boast an unofficial one. Mr Anwar’s government has banned Israeli ships from docking. Politicians join rallies against the West’s backing of Israel.
Mr Anwar’s stance is no surprise. He has long espoused Palestinian independence. Malaysia itself has refused to recognise Israel. Meanwhile his chief challenge comes from PAS, an ultra-conservative Islamic group and the largest party in parliament. He cannot afford to let pas outflank him on religious issues, or he loses power.
comes from PAS, an ultra-conservative Islamic group
If PAS is ultra-conservative then every single Western political party is ultra-ultra-ultra-ultra-ultra-conservative.
For now Mr Anwar sees little downside in his pro-Palestinian, anti-American stance. His government, keen on Western investment, says it is open for business. Yet more stridency may make investors wonder. As it is, Malaysia’s religiously tolerant ethnic minorities are growing more uncomfortable with the increased religiosity that the Gaza war has helped feed.
The government has drank the neoliberal Kool-Aid of foreign investments, yes, but seemingly these Western companies continue to keep coming despite the geopolitical positions of the country.
These fake concern for investments acting like the West and particularly the US are their biggest investors when that is not even the case for majority of ASEAN anymore.
In Indonesia feelings also run high. Yet the rhetoric among political leaders is relatively restrained. True, the government of Joko Widodo has condemned Israel’s imminent offensive on Rafah, Hamas’s last stronghold. And, in a recent opinion piece for The Economist that was widely cheered back home, the president-elect, Prabowo Subianto, condemned the West for caring more about Ukrainians’ fate than Palestinians’. Yet that is tame stuff compared with Mr Anwar: unlike Malaysia’s denial of Israel, Mr Prabowo calls for talks and a two-state solution. What factors explain the difference? Indonesia’s ties with Israel are closer than the elites like to let on.
Malaysian official foreign policy stance is still the two-state solution, although that has been obviously not mentioned in the context of the Zionist Regime’s relentless assault against the Palestinian people.
They include purchases of Israeli tech and weaponry. Before the war, secret talks looked likely to establish ties between the two countries, starting with reciprocal trade offices. Although Mr Prabowo denies Islamists’ claims that he is chummy with Israel, he is in little danger of being outflanked by hardliners, having absorbed key Muslim political groupings in his coalition. Domestic considerations count.
This is mostly true and Israeli-Indonesian relations will be mostly off the books by most accounts.
Any public relations, including normalization, despite Western sources stating otherwise, is near impossible. It’s not as likely as they otherwise try to picture.
Squeezed between Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore has close security ties with Israel—two small states encircled by danger. Yet Gaza greatly complicates the relationship, on account of domestic feeling. As Lawrence Wong, the incoming prime minister, told The Economist this week, even though the war in Ukraine carries economic consequences for Singapore, at an emotional level it resonates little.
encircled by danger
Yeah the two states are similar in their racism against Muslims, with their founders being White supremacists and having disdain of Islam and indigenous people. Surprisingly, they have close relations, I know.
By contrast, though Gaza has had negligible economic effect, it has had “a much higher level of resonance”, given the plight of Palestinians. The concern is that communal tensions might surface in ways that strain Singapore’s famed social and religious harmony. That, says the government, is why pro-Palestinian demonstrations have been banned. Christians, who are generally pro-Israel and account for 19% of the population, would demand their own protests, thereby bringing religious discord into the open. The government also fears that Malaysian stridency could cross the bridge that joins the two countries and foster extremism in Singapore.
communal tensions
A common phrase echoed by the Singaporean establishment to justify their continual interference and authoritarian measures of silencing dissent.
The racial undertones are also perfectly clear to those that aren’t blind. Who are the instigators in the picture they are trying to portray? With whom are they trying to gaud into being against?
This “surrounded by nefarious and scheming Muslims” rhetoric has been the hallmark of Singapore’s post independence psyche because it precisely justifies its own existence.
It is patently false since Malaysia has a larger Chinese population than Singapore’s total population. It ignores the fact that by declaring independence it put the Chinese in neighbouring Malaysia in jeopardy. This is why I say Singapore’s independence has been selfish. It was done to maintain the rule and capital accumulation of the colonial-era anglophone Singaporean bourgeoisie who would lose many of its privileges under a partnership with Malaysia.
This post-hoc justification is nothing but that, fluff that ironically, despite what they say, actually inflames racial and communal divisions more.
Bringing up the 19% Christian population is nothing but a diversionary tactic that ignores the realities of the mass support for Palestine. The Singaporean government simply doesn’t take the step forward because it would anger their monopoly-Capital overlords based in London and New York. It would challenge the long-standing justifications of their existence and bring about a truly progressive and international outlook that they truly despise.
The necessary response, Mr Wong says, is “to go out [and] explain to our people the positions that Singapore has taken”. That includes condemning Israel’s heavy hand, urging for a ceasefire and a two-state solution and providing aid to beleaguered Palestinians. Those steps are surely right in themselves. But in South-East Asia, when dealing with a distant war, never ignore factors that are close-to-hand.
Singapore’s position is closer to that of her European parents, which remains unsurprising as they have been colonised economically and spiritually. Singapore continues to contribute to the “accumulation of waste”, as coined by Ali Kadri, contributing to Israeli’s defense industry to defend against a mythical invasion from those dastardly Muslims.
in On the Future of Socialism in Malaya (1958)
in Malaysia’s ‘incomplete’ revolution (2023)
I was able to organize my life enough that I have some free time. As a result, I wanted to restart my project of compiling a digital list and references of Malaysian and Singaporean history, with particular focus on introducing the left-wing movements and debates in the country.
The top 2 quotes is the current introduction to the project.
I am just posting this to further incentivize me on finishing my current readings and the project.
Okay, to make this post more news-megaworthy, let me discuss this paper:
The Business Times - 4 Asean members among those said to have Putin’s blessing to join Brics as partners
A lot of fan fare about this. Odd considering that out of the 4, 2 of them Indonesia and Thailand, also seek to be part of OECD.
I maintain a welcoming but skeptical view of ASEAN member states joining BRICS.
The joke writes themselves but we all know this already.
The paper then goes on about Malaysia-Russia relations with not much substance.
Another article notes in it’s introductory line:
Colonialism is still a large part of national consciousness, even if it get’s subdued by neocolonial state narratives.