Later years Mao making compromises is not a stretegy to map onto whatever the heck america’s left is. Here is a excerpt from the People’s History of Ideas podcast in which Mao has essentially laid out the opposite of what you are saying, and in this case applied to the actual material conditions and to revolution, not maintaining power.

So Mao is saying that correct revolutionary strategy can’t only be deduced from using the theory that they had, he is saying that somehow there had to be some kind of influence, or oversight, or something coming from the masses, or else you’re going to have an incorrect revolutionary strategy. No one else is saying this at this meeting, so it really stands out.

So what is going on here? Now, there used to be historians who would look at statements like this and said that Mao wasn’t really a Marxist, he was just some peasant nationalist or populist or something. But we know too much about Mao these days to say Mao wasn’t a Marxist. He clearly was very committed to Marxist ideology. No one who seriously studies Chinese history would say that Mao wasn’t a serious Marxist today, however unorthodox he might seem, depending on what you think constitutes Marxist orthodoxy, which would be a whole other digression which we’ll avoid right now.

Well, and I’ll make this quick, because we’ve covered this history in some detail in past episodes of this podcast, what had been the experience so far of the Chinese Revolution with the dominant epistemology of just deducing what needed to be done from a preexisting body of theory? A bunch of very smart people decided that, based on an analysis of Chinese society, that a policy of uniting with the progressive section of the Chinese national bourgeoisie was necessary to move China toward socialism, because it had to go through a stage of democratic revolution and there was a necessary role to be played by the national bourgeoisie in that process. OK, fair enough. Now, as events evolved, questions were posed about what sort of sacrifices of the interests of the peasants and workers would need to be made to successfully pursue this strategy of uniting with the national bourgeoisie, embodied in the Guomindang Left which was led by Wang Jingwei. Mikhail Borodin and Chen Duxiu made difficult decisions, decisions that we know that they agonized over, that in the long term interests of the peasants and workers themselves, the Communist Party would have to acquiesce in the suppression of the peasant associations in Hunan by the militarists associated with the Guomindang Left. We’re talking serious massacres here. Borodin and Chen didn’t like to do this, but, they felt that this was the sort of hard headed decision making that had to be done in the overall interests of oppressed people. Eventually, they thought, their way of approaching the United Front would lead to liberation, and presumably when you added up the body count of dead peasants and workers at the end of the day, less would die through the strategy they were advocating than if they had taken a different course which ultimately wouldn’t lead to liberation.

Right, that’s the thinking there. That’s the thinking that Mao was characterizing as counter-revolutionary. And of course, Qu Qiubai and Besso Lominadze, the Comintern representative, also characterized this policy as seriously mistaken at the August 7 Emergency Conference. But, Qu and Lominadze argued that it was a mistaken application of Marxism, while Mao argues that it was due to “the influence of the masses over the Party leadership was far too small in the past.” Now, what did this mean? What was Mao saying here? Mao was a Marxist, so he thought that applying Marxist theory was necessary to come up with correct revolutionary strategy.But he also seems to be saying that, look, if the strategy that you come up with leads you down a path where you are acquiescing in the massacre of peasants, the suppression of workers’ unions, in the name of your revolutionary strategy, then you’ve gone off the rails somewhere. So, there needs to be some check on the Party and whether it is really revolutionary or not, and this comes, in some form or another, in the form of the masses having some important influence on the party. On some fundamental level, there is an element in the epistemology of revolutionary strategy and policy that relies on being in touch with and influenced by the masses.

And this is going to be a recurring theme in Mao, and is made more explicit in many of his widely read works, and I think is an important part of his appeal worldwide later on as the years go by. This sense of the inadequacy of revolutionary theory which is not checked or supervised by the masses, and which we see become disconnected from and, contrary to the initial intents of revolutionary organizations around the world, turned against the masses of people in so many instances over the course of the 20th century. Certainly, we see this thinking informing the Cultural Revolution. And really, I don’t think Mao always lives up to this ideal throughout his entire life, but you can judge that for yourself as we go on studying the history of global Maoism.

The statement in question is

“Before I arrived in Changsha, I had no reason to oppose the Party’s decision, which sided entirely with the landlords. Even after arriving in Changsha, I was still unable to answer this question. It was not until I had stayed in Hunan for more than 30 days that I completely changed my attitude. I made a report in Hunan expressing my opinion, and simultaneously also sent a report to the Center.” (Again, I want to refer listeners to episode 41 for our discussion of these reports that Mao made from Hunan and his experience there.) “This report had its impact in Hunan, but it had no influence whatever on the Center. The broad masses inside and outside the Party want revolution, yet the Party’s guidance is not revolutionary; there really is a hint of something counterrevolutionary about it. I have established these views under the guidance of the peasants. Formerly, I thought the opinion of the leading comrades was right, so I didn’t really insist on my own views. Thus my opinions, which they said were unreasonable, did not prevail… In sum, the influence of the masses over the Party leadership was far too small in the past.”

https://peopleshistoryofideas.com/episode-56-the-decisive-turn-to-overthrowing-the-guomindang-the-7-august-1927-emergency-conference/

Be specific, how does allying with people who want to do the genocide help stop the genocide and end the occupation? Don’t give me any foot in the door bullshit

I usually really respect your posts, but no, the only chance for socialists to distinguish themselves in the US is to divest from the two party system, publicly and loudly. Everyone here who we can work to pull to our side fucking hates both parties, and in my knowledge the most prominent ML party in the US got a lot of positive, free press by being clear about divesting from the two party system.

If all the socialists in America voted for Harris, she still would have lost. Harris lost because the Democrats have failed to govern.

I don’t think this is dialectical, long-term thinking. And I know that because so many of your other takes genuinely are that. I think what you’re describing here is just an elevated form of the lesser-evil electoral trap that liberalism forces its political subjects into.

American socialists do not have power, and more importantly, will not gain power by playing into such bourgeois schemes. I could see that argument if there was a left movement broadly in the US that could make those calculations and use such concessions as legitimate leverage.

But not only is that not the reality, it is so, so far from the reality. And the only consequence of socialists voting for one side or the other in our situation is the dirtying of our hands with the blood that imperialists squeeze out of both us and the world, only for that bloodstain to be a scarlet letter impeding actual organizing.

“This is not an option we can afford” — the more dialectical, long-term thinking version of that imo would be, “This the option we have no power to avoid; what does it mean for us”

We want to put a permanent end to the genocide against Palestinians, and we have to think of realistic strategies that can allow such a goal to be materialized in the future.

Well we for a ceasefire because of trump, and there is no sign Kamala would have pushed for such a thing.

We could apply similar logic to argue that it would be better for Trump to win because he’s less competent and more open about what he’s doing than whomever would have taken his place in 2028. Better people get shocked by open Fascism now than have the Dems manage the decline until they’re no longer able to keep up appearances and a competent Fascist takes power.